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Informal patient payments are a key characteristic of nearly all Central and Eastern European health
care systems (1–3). Apart from formal patient payments, which are regulated by national legislation
(4) and quasi-formal charges, which are set by the health care provider in the absence of clear
government regulations (5–7), there are also informal payments (also known as “under-the-table” or
“envelope” payments), which comprise the unregistered patient payments for publicly funded health
care services (7–9). In addition to this, there are also quasi-informal payments for goods that should
be provided free of charge to the patient by the health care establishment but that patients are asked
to purchase outside and bring for the treatment. Indeed, out-of-pocket patient payments are a major
source of health care funding in Central and Eastern European countries (10).
Informal patient payments warrant special attention as ignoring these payments causes an
underestimation of total health expenditure and their hidden nature imposes a great challenge to
the health care provision in terms of accessibility as well as accountability and transparency (2,
11–13). Informal payments constitute about 1.5–4.6% of total expenditure on health in Hungary,
about 0.3–0.5% in Poland, and about 2% in Bulgaria (14). Furthermore, a few decades ago, informal
patient payments were consideredmostly as “gratitudemoney,” or a socio-cultural phenomenon (5).
Currently,multi-dimensional explanations, such as insufficient resources (low income of physicians)
and inadequate governance (poor political-regulatory context) combined with the socio-cultural
reasons prevail in the literature (15–17). These three dimensions are rather interwoven leading
jointly to the existence of a specific pattern of informal patient payments in a country.
Empirical studies on informal payments are one of the main sources of evidences on this multi-
faceted phenomenon; however, they comprise a variety of methodological challenges (7), including
(a) the identification of a suitable sample unit (patients, citizens, providers, and/or officials), (b)
a socio-culturally acceptable data collection mode (face-to face interviews or self-administrated
questionnaires) (18, 19), and (c) adequate operational definitions of informal patient payments
because some respondents find it difficult to distinguish between formal and informal payments (9,
20). The difficulties related to an adequate methodology design and implementation may explain
the focus of most empirical studies on single countries and on the scale and determinants of these
payments rather than on complex multi-country comparative studies (7). Still, a huge variety in the
nature and patterns of informal patient payments is reported across countries (7). Studies provide
evidence on the variation in the type of informal payments (cash or in-kind gifts given by patients
or their families), timing (before, after or during service provision), subject (out- or in-patient
service), purpose (obtaining better quality or access), andmotivation (physician’s request or patient’s
initiative) (1, 3, 8).
Last but not least, the key characteristics of informal patient payments studied should also
include the perceptions and attitudes toward these payments, which are the most indicative in a
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cross-country comparison. Indeed, evidence on perceptions and
attitudes toward informal patient payments may play an essential
role in developing and implementing adequate strategies for deal-
ing with these payments (21–23). A cross-country comparison of
public attitudes, perceptions, and opinions on informal patient
payments is presented in Stepurko et al. (3). In 2010, represen-
tatives of households in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, and Ukraine consistently reported negative attitudes
toward informal cash payments. This suggests a prevalence of cor-
ruption connotation, which is evidence of its social undesirability.
In-kind gifts are more often perceived as gratitude than informal
cash payments. More positive perceptions of informal payments
in general are observed among those who have ever given in-kind
gifts rather than those who have ever paid informally in cash.
Concerning cross-country patterns, public perceptions in some
countries (especially in Poland but also in Bulgaria) are less pos-
itive about informal patient payments than in other countries
(specifically in Hungary and Ukraine). In terms of policy analysis
and research, it is important to distinguish truly gratitude informal
payments that have practically no impact on health care service
provision, from other types of informal payments (bribes) that
undermine the functioning of the health care system, and attitude
study provides one piece to this puzzle.
Moreover, when perceived behavior related tomaking informal
patient payments has been studied (24), it also appears that health
care users in Bulgaria and Poland are less inclined to make infor-
mal payments, while health care users in Romania and Ukraine
most often report such payments. The informal payment rates for
Hungary and Lithuania fall between these two groups. In all six
countries, individuals who feel uncomfortable when leaving the
physician’s office without a gratuity and who feel unable to refuse
the request of medical staff to pay informally, more often make
informal payments. Additionally, it has been found that socio-
demographic characteristics have lower relevance compared to
perceived behavior. Indeed, the behavioral pattern of making
informal patient payments is mostly associated with patient’s per-
ceptions, while socio-demographic features play a minor role in
explaining this pattern. Specifically, those who feel uncomfortable
to leave without a gratitude payment and who feel unable to refuse
to pay informally if asked,more often reportmaking informal pay-
ments than the rest of the respondents. The less positive attitudes
and perceptions toward informal patient payments in Poland can
be attributed to the successful anti-corruption policies supported
by mass-media and relatively better governance in the country
than in neighboring countries (3).
Public opinions and individual perceptions provide a good
ground for better understanding the level and patterns of informal
patient payments. Variation in informal patient payments with
regards to the country and year of occurrence, type of service used,
the purpose and initiator of the payment shed more light on the
roots of the informal payments, and therefore strategies for their
eradication (25). The results of the cross-country comparison
mentioned above suggest a relatively higher prevalence of infor-
mal patient payments in Ukraine than in Bulgaria, where patients
also meet formal service charges in the public sector. More than
35% of health care users in Ukraine report informal payments
for physician visits during the preceding 12months in addition
to widespread quasi-formal payments (26), while in Bulgaria it is
<10%. Regarding hospitalizations, the percentage of service users
who report informal payments is also higher in Ukraine (more
than 40%) and lower in Bulgaria (10–20%). It should be noted
that in Bulgaria, the private health care sector has considerably
grown during the last decades, which provides alternatives to the
public health care services. This can explain to a certain extent the
lower share of informal patient payments in Bulgaria as Bulgarian
patients may opt for private services and avoid informal payments
in the public sector.
Informal payments are more spread and higher when they are
solicited or expected by providers (25). However, the relatively
high prevalence of informal patient payments inHungary does not
follow this logic since informal payments in Hungary are mostly
initiated by the consumers (3). This underlines the importance
of country-specific strategies for dealing with informal patient
payments. In Hungary, in particular, the initial objective of such
strategy should be the revision of national regulations, which at
this moment are supportive to informal payments (23).
Furthermore, the probability and the size of the informal pay-
ment are to a great extent determined by the type of service
consumed (GP or specialist, out-patient or in-patient care) (15,
27). The trend of a higher number of users who make more
expensive informal payments to specialists when compared to
GPs remains noticeable. It is similar for surgery and childbirth
compared to other hospital interventions. Indeed, the number of
payers and the amounts paid (including informal payers) are high-
est for hospitalizations related to childbirth or pregnancy (25). For
example, in Ukraine, about half of the in-patients report informal
payments for pregnancy or delivery, although the median value
of these payments is about 70–100AC while total payment is about
two to three times higher.
Insufficient data on maternity care provision in Eastern Euro-
pean countries have drawn the attention of researchers to the
qualitative aspects of the process of informal payments (28, 29).
Qualitative study conducted in the capital of Ukraine shed some
light on the experience of consumers and providers with informal
payment for childbirth (28). The methodology of ethnographic
study has enabled us to learnmore about local specificity of human
behavior related to the process and nature of informal patient
payments for childbirth. In 2008–2009, two groups of patients
in the Ukrainian maternity care ward are identified: “individual
patients” and “emergency room patients.” Also, push factors that
lead to a search for a “personal obstetrician” in Ukraine are
described as the need for 24 hours access to reliable information
and the need for psychological comfort during the childbirth.
Thus, gaining better “service wrapping” (reliable information, bet-
ter attention, responsiveness) against the background of feelings
of anxiety is seen by patients as a strategy to avoid “substandard
care.” The obstetricians do not conceal their experience on the
redistribution of the informal payments among medical staff as
well as the use of money to buy pharmaceuticals and to maintain
physicians’ wards. Informal payments not only add to the salary
of the obstetricians but also to the salary of other staff members
and to the budget of the hospital facility. In fact, the low salary of
medical staff is indicated by both obstetricians andmothers as the
main cause for the existence of informal payments. Thus, informal
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payments remain an unregulated tool that ensures extra payments
to health care providers when adequate reimbursement policies
are lacking.
Variations in regulatorymechanisms, availability of alternatives
to informal payments as a means for achieving better quality and
access, level and sources of funding can explain the cross-country
diversity (30). Meanwhile, the devotion to accepting, giving, and
relying on informal patient payments observed in the region can
become a great obstacle in introducing health care reforms in any
of the countries. Informal patient payments affect the health care
system at the macro (system) level as they impede health care
reforms, and at the micro (service) level by creating barriers to
adequate care (1, 30). Most important, however, informal patient
payments distort equity since patients who cannot afford to pay
informally might be deprived from adequate health care (31).
Thus, strategies for dealing with informal patient payments and
their causes are urging.
However, the ability of the government to ensure a good perfor-
mance of the public sector in general and of the health care sector,
in particular, is seen as a key factor for avoiding shadow practices.
So far, political decision-making in Eastern Europe has been too
much based on the interests of business (the medical elites in
case of health care) with too little consideration of evidence-based
strategies and public opinion. This impedes real positive changes
in public service provision regardless of the policy goals stated by
the governments. Therefore, changes in governments and interna-
tional organization interventions may give a stimulus to improve
governance and the culture of management of all public sectors.
The ultimate challenge for policy-makers is to realize that when
informal patient payments appear in health care, it also aggravates
the health and wealth of the nation.
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